Similarly, when mental health practitioners confront feelings of angst, conflict, and frustration
before coming to the best practice decision they can, they are attempting to protect excellence in
practice.
While many aspects of existential theory have been helpful in developing the concept of
professional dissonance, the existential concepts of ontological guilt and ontological anxiety
have most influenced the conceptualization. In order to understand these ideas, the existential
concepts of being and being-in-the-world, authenticity, and bad faith are first presented and
briefly defined. An exposition of ontological guilt and ontological anxiety follows.
Being and Being-in-the-World. Existential philosophers place a great deal of emphasis on being.
Maddi (1996) points out that the German word for being (“daesin”) does not carry the static
connotation that “being” has in the English language. Instead, the word is more active and
actually means, “becoming.” In this way, the existential focus is on human potentiality. In order
to always be “becoming” and not have stagnated, the person must continue to act authentically
and avoid bad faith actions that delude and detract from the metamorphic process of becoming.
As it applies to mental health practitioners, the concept of being would, among other things,
connote continuing to develop as an excellent practitioner, working hard to lend individuality to
every practice situation, and having a dynamic, present orientation.
Authenticity versus Bad Faith Actions. Authenticity is often used as a synonym for genuineness.
Hepworth, Rooney, and Larsen (1997), in their widely used direct practice social work textbook,
define authenticity as “the sharing of self by relating in a natural, sincere, spontaneous, open and
genuine manner” (p. 120). They further describe the authentic social worker’s verbalizations as
congruent with their thoughts and feelings. In this way, they relate to consumers as real people,
expressing and taking responsibility for their feelings instead of denying them or blaming the
client for them. This focus on congruency between thoughts and feelings, and on assuming
responsibility for them whether or not they fit in with societal ideas of what is normal or good, is
closely related to the existential focus on authenticity. The existential hero, exemplified in texts
such as Camus’ (1946) The Stranger and Sartre’s (1947) The Age of Reason, embodies the ideal
of “authenticity” and is therefore often seen as abnormal or strange as s/he strives to realize
“being.” By acting in accordance with internal guidance, the existential hero avoids being
deluded by the trappings of normality and the conformity of society. In this way, bad faith
actions are guarded against and the individual continues her/his process of “becoming.”
Bad faith actions are the antithesis of authenticity. When an individual acts in a “bad faith” way,
s/he is acting against what his or her inner voice is directing. For example, a social worker who
internally supports an individual consumer’s stance not to take medication because the worker
believes that for this consumer the disadvantages outweigh the advantages, commits a bad faith
action when s/he pursues an inpatient commitment due to pressure from a supervisor or from the
consumer’s family. Similarly, a practitioner who upholds self-determination simply because s/he
doesn’t want to have to struggle with the paperwork involved in a commitment procedure, even